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Since August 1945, a special relationship has existed
between Japan and the United States. The relationship, born
in world combat and in a unique way tempered during the
Korean War, has grown into an economic and political partner-
ship which is now undergoing a dramatic metamorphis. A new
political geometry is forming in Asia and the final form of
this structure has yet to be determined. Since 1950, Japan
has been the major ally of the United States in Asia, not
only as the location of the greatest concentration of Asian
military bases, but also as an example of a viable democratic
government. However, coupled with the transformation in the
American relationship with Japan, Asian politics have been
shaken by a series of events with far reaching implications
for both the United States and Japan. The appearance on the
world stage of a new and not well understood actor—the
Chinese Dragon, the evolution of an uncertain new direction
in American foreign policy after Viet Nam, and events such
as the Arab oil embargo have added additional complicating
dimensions to an already involved international equation.
This paper has two major objectives. The first is to
define and analyze the emerging relationship between Japan
and the United States in terms of the Asian political system.

The second objective is to identify the various political,
military, and strategic alternatives available to the United
States in this highly complicated area of the world. In
order to cover these objectives adequately, many differing
issues must be examined and, although this paper primarily
is concerned with the relationship between the United States
and Japan, the roles of other countries which have both the
power and ambition to influence events in Asia must be con-
sidered. In this regard, one of the primary questions to be
examined is how do Japan and China view each other's emergence
as world or regional powers and how are their perspectives
likely to influence each others foreign policies? Then, how
are these perspectives likely to influence American policy in
Asia? In examining these and other questions, the increasing
involvement of the Soviet Union in the Pacific also must be
analyzed and evaluated.
For reasons of clarity and to provide a better perspec-
tive of the scope of this subject, the paper has been divided
into five major sections. In Section II, in order to build a
framework for analysis and develop a historical perspective,
the origins of the United States-Japanese partnership are
outlined with special emphasis on the history of the mutual
security treaty. Section III traces the development of Japan
as an economic superpower and emphasizes the fragile nature of

this power. In Section IV the organization for security in
Japan is analyzed and the forces influencing rearmanent
examined. Section V reviews the dominant economic position
of Japan in East Asia and the relationship of the Japanese
with China and the Soviet Union. Finally, the last section
analyses the present strategic position of the United States
in East Asia and attempts to tie together the complicated
threads of the involved relationships to determine alternative
political and strategic options for the United States.

II. BACKGROUND
A. The Origins of the Partnership . The origins of the
unique relationship between the United States and Japan are
found in the years of the American occupation. This occupation
and its legacy of paternalism has, until recently, influenced
the manner in which Japan and the United States have viewed
each other and have conducted their respective foreign relations
in Asia. In his almost messianic approach as he went about
"building democracy" in Japan after World War II, General
Douglas MacArthur personified the spirit of the American
occupation. As head of the Supreme Command of Allied Powers
(SCAP) , MacArthur directed the economic and political democra-
tization programs after the war. He directed these programs
with a strident, emotional intensity and with a campaign that
had the fervor of a religious crusade. MacArthur characterized
this campaign in his Reminiscences:
Japan had become the world's great laboratory for
an experiment in the liberation of a people from
totalitarian military rule and for the liberalization
of government from within.... First destroy the military
power. Punish the war criminals. Build the structure of
representative government. Modernize the Constitution.
Hold free elections. Release the political prisoners.
Liberate the farmers. Establish a free labor movement.
Encourage a free economy. Abolish police oppression.
Develop a free and responsible press. Liberalize edu-
cation. Decentralize the political power. Separate
church and state.
1
^Douglass MacArthur, Reminiscences (New York, 1964) pp. 282-283.

As an illustration of the political atmosphere during the
occupation, MacArthur at this time was described by one
Japanese diplomat as: "a shining obelisk in the timeless
march onward toward an enduring peace.
"
2
The heritage of this occupation period is extremely
important for it is in MacArthur' s independent administration
of Japan that the Japanese Constitution was written with its
famous and influential peace articles. This "peace clause"
was to cause serious future political problems for both the
United States and Japan.
Article IX of the Japanese Constitution reads:
Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based
on justice and order, the Japanese people forever
renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation, and
the threat or use of force as a means of settling
international disputes.
In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding
paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other
war potential will never be mentioned. The right of
belligerency of the State will not be recognized.
The Japanese Constitution, including the above clause,
imposed on the Japanese by the United States occupation gov-
ernment, has returned to haunt American policy makers attempt-
ing to convince the Japanese to develop a stronger security
force and to increase defense spending.
Despite the fact that this constitution was imposed on
2Ibid, p. 277.

Japan by a foreign power, it has grown into an accepted and
integral part of the Japanese system of government and has
become a legitimating factor for political processes. It
has a moral and intellectual status for the Japanese similar
to that the Constitution of the United States holds for the
American people. As a result, the Japanese Constitution
could not be changed lightly without serious political conse-
quences and today Japan is the only nation in the world in
which the right of belligerency is specifically denied by a
constitution. This fact underlies and overshadows all con-
siderations of defense policy in Japan.
The occupation of Japan can be divided into two distinct
periods. The first period, from 1945 through 1948, reflected
MacArthur's idealism and the concept of revolutionary change
for traditional Japanese society. It was the aim of SCAP to
democratize Japan not only in the political but in the economic
sense. The overall purpose was to ensure that Japan would
never again threaten the world with militaristic ambitions.
The second period of the occupation evolved with the coming
of the Korean War:
The policy, which began as a policy of punish-
ment for Zaibatsu and other economic institutions of
the enemy of yesterday, began to be subjected to
strong pressures for change almost as soon as it was
implemented. The rapidly changing nature of inter-
national politics, the Cold War, and mounting criticism

of SCAP policies in Washington (charges of anti-
business, of making a ward of the United States, and
even of socialism) were significant parts of this
pressure.
^
Japan then came to be seen as the logical American ally to
counter communist expansion in Asia and the Japanese-American
Treaty is the concrete example of this radical shift in the
foreign policy of the United States. This Security Treaty
has influenced the foreign policy style of Japan for almost
twenty years and still has an important impact on the Japanese
view of their security problems.
The fall of Nationalist China in 1949 and the beginning
of the Korean War influenced the attitude of the American
occupation. No longer was it the main object of SCAP to ensure
a peaceful and pastoral Japan. What was needed was a strong
ally in the Pacific to help in containing communism and to
act as a logistic support area during the Korean War. The
Security Treaty was a natural result of this change in attitude.
The Security Treaty between the United States and Japan,
was signed in 1952 with the Treaty of Peace. This agreement
was revised as the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security
in 1960 when it generated a considerable amount of violent
Kozo Yamamura, Economic Policy in Postwar Japan (Berkeley
and Los Angeles, 1967) p. 173.

8domestic opposition and sparked serious riots in Tokyo. The
treaty was automatically extended in 1970 and can now, with
one years' notice, be terminated by either party. The im-
portant point however is that this treaty provided a security
umbrella which enabled Japan to follow a foreign policy which
helped to make it, from an economic standpoint, the third
strongest nation in the world. Despite the effectiveness
of this security blanket, however, events since 1972 have
called into question some of the precepts which have stood
as the foundation of this Security Agreement.
As containment came to Asia first in the context of
the Korean War and in the "loss" of China, Viet Nam also was
seen as an attempt to hold the line against agressive communism
and to restrain the great Red Dragon to the North. Even
before this, within the context of subdued regional conflict
after the Korean War, the giants of Asia, Japan and China,
were beginning to give indications of their later power.
At the same time that new Asian nations were developing
their new found national aspirations, economic and political
strength, the world in general seemed to be growing out of
the bipolar nature that had justified the tactics of the Cold
War. The Sino-Soviet split, the development of cracks in the
wall of monolithic communism, echoed this passing of a simple
U.S. -USSR view of the world. The new explanation of the

international structure was that the world, in a power sense,
was becoming multipolar. In this new power structure, the
United States and Russia no longer held exclusive control over
the sources of nuclear destruction. But, more than a simple
matter of nuclear weapons and industrial might, the world was
beginning to be seen with a broader and infinitely more com-
plicated structure of power relationships.
Within this new world power structure, the Viet Nam
War became a battleground not only in reality, but in an
ideological sense; a battleground which framed the debate
over the future of American foreign policy. There is an
infinite spectrum of opinions on the meaning of the Viet Nam
conflict for the future of American foreign policy but the
controversy in the United States and Japan has settled around
the meaning of the Nixon Doctrine. The change in the political
power structure in Asia and the Nixon Doctrine have forced
Japan to re-evaluate its foreign and security policy. It is
in this context that the many facets of the emerging view of
Japanese foreign policy and security must be examined. In a
fundamental sense, both the United States and Japan are under-
going basic re-examinations of their foreign policies. Both
of these nations are at the crossroads of security decisions
which for decades will influence the stability of Asia. The
security alternatives facing the United States and Japan in

10
the post-Viet Nam world and the factors influencing these




III. REBIRTH OF THE PHOENIX
A. From the Ashes , With the relationship with the
United States, one of the primary determinants of Japanese
foreign policy decisions since 1952 has been Japan's success
in obtaining rapid economic growth. The story of Japan since
World War II is the story of the growth of an economic giant
and to be understood, the story must be analyzed in economic
terms. In the 1946-1947 period, as in no other country in
modern times, Japan was psychologically and physically devas-
tated, its factories were destroyed, its proud people had
suffered defeat for the first time in its long history and
for the first time Japan was occupied by a foreign power. In
1946 the nation itself was on the verge of mass starvation.
At war's end per capita food intake was at 1,042 calories and
the Gross National Product in 1945 was only slightly over 50
percent of the 1937 level. 4 The country had lost all foreign
assets, $22 billion in Manchuria alone. However, in less than
30 years this small country, roughly the size of California,
rose from the ashes of World War II to develop the third
largest GNP in the world. Many of the threads of contemporary
Japanese foreign policy problems are woven into the fabric




If Japan deserves the status and classification of
super-power in any sense of the terra, it is in the category
of economic strength. Japan now has the third largest GNP
in the world. In 1950 the Korean War put the devastated
Japanese economy on the road to recovery. In order to support
the American effort in Korea, millions of dollars were poured
into Japanese industry especially in the vital steel, cement,
and textile sectors. In addition, by 1953, as has already
been illustrated, SCAP's restrictive economic policies had
been repealed and heavy importation of foreign technology had
begun. This importation of large amounts of foreign technol-
ogy made a significant difference in the later international
competitive edge of Japanese industry. In a similar manner,
reconstruction of the industrial capacity destroyed during
the war provided both the opportunity and the necessity for
installation of the most modern technical processes and equip-
ment. In fact, most of the industrial capacity in Japan's
major industries has been installed in the past 15-20 years.
This technological edge given by the modern industries has
Appendix I illustrates the trend in growth of Japan's Gross
National Product in comparison with other selected countries.
^Eugene Kaplan, Japan, The Government Business Relationship
(Washington D.C., 1972) p. 8.
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had an obvious result in the international competitive advan-
tage enjoyed by the Japanese.
The conscious decision made by the Japanese government
after World War II to make economic recovery the principle
goal of the nation is a major factor in Japan's economic
success story. This success, in turn, has led to the naming
of this single minded policy as "Japan Incorporated, " the
idea that the whole nation of Japan should function for the
single goal of gaining rapid economic growth. An important
corollary of the reason for this economic success has been
the friendly umbrella of the Mutual Security Treaty, personi-
fied by the power of the United States Seventh Fleet.
B. Vulnerable Giant . The Arab oil embargo brought to
light a fact that already was well appreciated in Japan.
While Japan is indeed an economic superpower, its power is
both vulnerable and fragile.
Japan imports 96 percent of its iron ore, 100 percent of
its bauxite, and 98 percent of its liquid fuel. Undoubtedly
the most important of these imports is petroleum. It has been
estimated that Japan has from two weeks to one month reserve
of crude oil. Various authorities have observed that were
imports of coal and particularly oil completely cut off,




weeks. Most of thxs imported petroleum is delivered to Japan
by tankers sailing from the Arabian Gulf and these imports are
o
expected to increase significantly over the next decade.
The strategic vulnerability of this large amount of shipping
to military and political pressure has serious implications
for Japan's security and continued economic success.
Japanese tankers sailing from the Arabian Gulf travel
through either the Malacca, Sunda, or Lombok and Makassar
Straits. The Malacca Straits are immediately south of
Singapore while the others are passages through the Indonesian
Archipelago. In the Declaration of 1957, Indonesia declared
Q
its Archipelago Doctrine. This doctrine claims the Sunda,
Lombok, and Makassar Straits as internal Indonesian waters
and gives Indonesia a legal rationale for restricting free
passage if it would ever have reason to do so. These straits
are commonly used by Japanese super tankers which are of
'James William Morley, Forecast for Japan: Security in the
1970's , (Princeton, N.J., 1972) p. 26.
®See table 1 for current comparisons and projections of
Japan's growth in petroleum consumption; also see "Coal
a Revival in Japan, " Far Eastern Economic Review , March 4,
197, pp. 56-57 for additional information on Japan's domestic
energy reserves.
9For a discussion of Indonesia's position of free passage and
territorial limits, see Richard A. Miller, "Indonesia's
Archipelago Doctrine and Japan's Juglar" United States Naval
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excessive draft (65 ft.) to go the shorter and shallower
Malacca Strait route. The importance of the closing of these
straits to Japan would be a significant and perhaps unaccep-
table increase (approximately one third) in the price of oil
in Japan, in addition to long delays in delivery time. The
important point is that these statistics illustrate the degree
to which Japan is strategically dependent on open sea lanes
and the traditional right of innocent passage. Japan, as an
island nation and as a result of World War II, understands
better than most countries the importance of free and clear sea
lanes.
It will be some time before the final effects of the
Arab oil pressure and embargo on Japan will be completely
documented and evaluated. However, it is already apparent
that the economic impact to Japan's growth rate will be
significant. The embargo presented Japan with two basic
problems. The first is the possible reduction in the economic
growth rate caused by the difficulty in obtaining raw materials.
In reaction to this difficulty, Japanese officials are predic-
ting the possibility of the economy plunging from 9.5 percent
real growth in 1973 to a complete standstill by the Spring of
1974. Various industrialists are projecting losses of from
6-8 percent to 55 percent. At the same time, the vital auto-
mobile industry is talking of a production cutback of 17 percent
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in 1974-1975. ° The second major problem is that there is
a real question whether Japan as an importing country, can
continue to pay out the huge amounts of foreign currency which
are needed in view of the recent increases in the price of
Arabian Gulf oil and predicted rise in cost of other raw
materials. Arab oil that cost $3.40 a barrel in 1971 rose
to $10.30 by January 1, 1974. The Far Eastern Economic Review
has reported that "should Japan keep importing crude oil
totaling 3 billion tons or more a year, it would have to pay
more than 30 percent of its total import bill—and more than
four times the fiscal 1973 oil bill. " In the winter of
1973, foreign currency reserves in Japan were at $19 billion.
By January of 1974 they were $13 billion and projected to go
12below $10 billion by April 1974. The importance of the
reduction in the growth rate in Japan cannot be overestimated.
Since 1955, Japan has used a high growth rate to fuel its
prosperity and, in a sense to support its foreign policy. The
foreign and domestic strategies of the government have been
based on the ability to continue a high rate of economic
expansion. The slowing or stopping of this growth will have
1QThe Economist , November 24, 1973, p. 82.




serious implications not only for the economic sector of
Japanese society but also for the political stability of
the country.
In addition to the Arab oil pressure, the recent trip
of Prime Minister Tanaka to Indonesia in January of 1974
illustrates a problem that will be discussed in greater
detail in Section V. This is the fact that Japan's economic
policy has made it highly unpopular with some of the Southeast
Asian trading partners upon which it depends for raw materials.
Indonesia particularly is a country which Japan has been
cultivating as an alternative source for petroleum. The other
countries of Southeast Asia are equally critical for Japan's
continued economic growth.
The foregoing illustrations demonstrate that while Japan
has enormous strength in an economic sense, this economy is
extremely vulnerable to military, political, and economic
pressure. This pressure is especially serious when it threatens
Japan's sources of raw materials. Gregory Clark, an Australian
journalist, reported in 1971 that a Japanese diplomat return-
ing from a GATT metting commented:
the atmosphere is just like on the eve of World War II
when America, Britain, China, and Holland surrounded
Japan in the Pacific and tried to squeeze Japan by
pressing on its supply of raw materials. 13
13Gregory Clark, "The Fragile Face of Force," Survival,
March 1971, p. 86.
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This comment, while extreme, may be considered illustrative
of Japan's attitude toward the importance of free access to
raw materials. The events of 1973 proved that raw materials
are as crucial to Japan in the 1970* s as they were in the 1930' s.
In fact, these raw materials may be even more important given
the size of the present Japanese economy and the standard of
living to which the Japanese people have become accustomed.
Richard Ellingworth has pointed out one manner in which
the restrictions on imports could force Japan to react:
Economic frustration, especially if accompanied by
widespread unemployment at home and the denial of what
Japan conceives to be her fair place abroad could
eventually lead to a mood of disillusion, the rebirth
of chauvinism and even attempt to rely on force or the
threat of force. 4
In 1970 Herman Kahn stated:
the Japanese have, in effect discovered or developed an
ability to grow, economically, with a rapidity that is
unlikely to be surpassed . . . and that might well result,
late in the twentieth century or early in the twenty-
first, in Japan's possessing the largest gross national
product in the world. 15
Japan's present economic problems have cast some very reason-
able doubts about predictions of this type. The dependence of
the Japanese on increasingly expensive raw materials and
l^Richard Ellingworth, Japanese Economic Policies and Security ,
Adelphi Paper no. 90., p. 32.
15Herman Kahn, The Emerging Japanese Superstate (Englewood
Cliffs, N.J., 1970) p. 2.
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economic vulnerability to threats against these supplies makes
unqualified enthusiasm for Japan's ability to continue to grow
at 10 percent or anything approaching this rate, highly doubt-
ful. The Arab oil embargo could be just the first of a series
of damaging blows to Japan's economic growth.
Coupled with external strategic problems, Japan's
domestic economic policy may be undergoing a change in direc-
tion. The problems connected with the rapid economic growth
of the 1960's
—
pollution, overcongestion and inflation—have
caused many sectors of Japanese society to demand a change
from the policy of rapid economic growth to one which empha-
sizes improvement in environmental condition and general
welfare of the Japanese people. As a result, there is a
swelling domestic demand for a change from policies of rapid
growth to economic policies for stability. For example,
Finance Minister Fukuda, in an address to the Diet in November
1973, called for a shift from a high growth line to a policy
which would create a welfare society. At the same time he
called for a reduction in the budget for the Fourth Defense
Plan. ^6 To this point, the ruling Liberal Democratic Party
has paid only lip service to these demands for a new economic
policy, but domestic political pressure could cause a change
in the near future.
* 6The Economist, November 24, 1973, p. 83.
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IV. THE YEN FOR SECURITY
A. Security and the Foreign Policy Process . "The most
important component of the Japanese foreign policy formulation
17process is the political party system. " The structure and
form of Japanese domestic politics color, guide, and limit the
course of foreign policy formulation in Japan to an extent
that cannot be overemphasized. The democratic institutions
imposed during the occupation rest in a fragile alliance with
the political traditions of Japan.
The great historic problem of modern Japanese politics
has been the high degree of separation between those
formal political institutions borrowed from the West,
together with the set of ideas that accompanied them,
and much broader social institutions bred from within
Japanese society, together with the set of ideas that
accompanied these. 18
Associated with the one party rule that has emerged in
Japan, a unique style of factional politics has developed
within all political parties but particularly in the powerful,
ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) . This factional system
flavors the manner in which foreign policy is determined and
it has made it much more difficult for the ruling party to
17Donald C. Hellmann, Japanese Domestic Politics and Foreign
Policy (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1969) p. 13.
18Robert A. Scalapino and Junnosuke Masumi, Parties and




initiate dynamic and constructive foreign policy options.
As a result of the factional system and of a natural "little
brother" relationship with America, much of Japan's history of
foreign policy since 1951 has been a type of "knee jerk"
reaction to foreign policy initiatives of the United States.
Another problem closely connected with the intra-party
factional divisions of the LDP, is that the opposition parties
in Japan have, except for a short period during the occupation,
remained in opposition. These parties—the Socialists (JSP)
,
Communists (JCP) , and Koraeito—have, since they have been in
opposition permanently, tended to use irresponsible and
destructive political tactics. Incidents of fisticuffs on
the floor of the Diet are prominent examples of this destruc-
tive style of political opposition. These opposition tactics
have been characterized by a policy of opposition for opposition
sake, and these parties have not attempted to gain power through
the development of pragmatic political strategies and have
failed to offer viable political alternatives.
Despite the fact that foreign policy decisions are made
exclusively by the conservatives, the unique traditional form
of concensus decision making in Japan encourages the LDP to
take into consideration the extremist position of the
opposition parties. The result is a softening and compromising
of most controversial foreign policy positions to take into
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consideration the opposition viewpoint. The results of the
national elections in 1972 show a dramatic increase in
opposition seats and may indicate that these parties, partic-
ularly the JSP and JCP, may have adopted more reasonable and
pragmatic political strategies. For the first time it may
be that the opposition sees the opportunity to gain signifi-
cant political power through the electoral process.
While the domestic style of factional politics and
economic issues influence foreign policy, the question of
security—conventional versus nuclear rearmament and the
security relationship with the United States—occupies a
central position in the Japanese debate. Security policy has
served as the focus of the opposition parties criticism of the
LDP. The opposition's adament stand in favor of a vague,
undefined "neutrality" and abrogation of the security treaty
has set the boundaries for political debate. The opposition
has inhibited the conservatives from taking the initiative in
formulating policy. Short term actions rather than broad,
long range programs have become the style of security planning.
Finally, because security and defense planning are such
politically sensitive subjects and partly because of the
Japanese economic orientation toward foreign policy, a strong
stand for a strengthened military posture, other than for
defense of the home islands, has not been a politically viable
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position. In this regard, Donald Hellmann has pointed out
that:
The very fact that the issue of disarmament has
become so integral to domestic partisan machinations
will make extremely difficult easy transition to
security responsibilities beyond passive territorial
defense, no matter how strong the national imperative. ^
After the Korean War, Japan made a conscious decision to make
rapid economic growth the basic goal of foreign policy. This
goal ignored the political implications of economic and
political interdependency and this "trading company" style of
foreign policy earned Japan the title of "Japan Incorporated.
"
In a real sense, Japan's style of economic foreign policy was
possible because the United States had established a security
"status quo" in East Asia.
The Nixon Doctrine and the prospect of American disen-
gagement from Asia have threatened the foundations of Japan's
post war security position and have brought to the forefront
the politically painful and potentially divisive issues con-
cerning the scope of Japan's security interests and military
policies beyond self defense. 20 For Japan, the American
rapproachment with China has added another apparently
19Donald C. Hellmann, Japan and East Asia: The New Inter-
national Order (New York, 1972) pp. 156-157.
20Robert E. Osgood, The Weary and the Wary (Johns Hopkins
University, 1972) p. 40.
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destabilizing factor to East Asian politics.
The problem of foreign policy formulation in Japan is
that, in a seemingly contradictory way, the very economic
success of Japan has been a factor in restraining development
of constructive, dynamic foreign policy options. "The
momentum of past success, " Donald Hellman has noted, "will
inhibit new initiatives particularly in the military field.
The Japanese have been protected both by the United States
and by the success of their economic "non-policy" from having
to deal with complicated diplomatic problems or international
crisis. The Japanese reaction to the Arab oil embargo
illustrates the emergence of Japanese foreign policy from this
warm cocoon into the cold and sometimes hostile environment
of crisis involvement. This emergence, still in process, has
and will continue to be difficult for the Japanese. Faction-
alism, the style of political opposition and the trading company
attitude toward foreign policy all have combined to inhibit
the development of a creative style of diplomacy and foreign
policy formulation. Japan is an economic superpower that has
not developed yet its own style of foreign policy. Certainly
this Japanese style of "non-policy" was extremely efficient
in an Asia stabilized by the United States. The problem
O 1
^"Hellmann in Morley, p. 156.
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emerges, as it has recently in the Southeast Asian turmoil and
the Arab embargo, when Japan is faced with the necessity to
react to problems in an unstable world without the assurance
that the United States will provide stability and protection.
This insecurity on the part of Japanese policy makers, combined
with the prospect that the Japanese economy will not be able to
continue its spectacular growth, implies that Japan's past
style of "economic non-involvement" is no longer going to be
viable.
B. Domestic Politics and Security . The conservative
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) has ruled, with one exception
during the occupation, since 1945. Until the Diet elections
of 1973, the opposition parties showed little real threat of
cutting into the traditional political strength of the LDP.
However the general election for the House of Representatives
in December 1972 showed a strong rise in the strength of the
Japan Communist Party (JCP) . In this election, one of every
ten voters voted for the Japanese Communist Party. This
opposition party acquired 38 seats in the House of Represen-
tatives and became the second ranking opposition party behind
the Socialists in total seats. Because of their historic
opposition to the Japanese-American security arrangement, the
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rising strength of the opposition parties has serious
implications for Japanese defense policy.
The Japan Socialist Party (JSP) remains the second
strongest party in Japanese politics. The position of this
party on defense is an extreme one and has not varied to a
great extent over the history of the party. The JSP position
on defense calls for the institution of "unarmed neutrality"
and complete abrogation of the Mutual Security Treaty with
the United States. This party also calls for the disbanding
of the Self Defense Forces, withdrawal of American forces and
abandonment of all military bases.
The position of the Japanese Communist Party (JCP) on
defense matters is less well defined. The JCP argues for
termination of the Mutual Security Treaty and the eviction
of United States forces. However, unlike the JSP, the
communists have never championed unarmed neutrality. Rather,
they have maintained that some type of socialist military
force will be necessary for defense against American agression.
The Komeito, the Clean Government Party, until the poor
showing in the 1972 elections, argued for a gradual dissolution
of the Security Treaty. In 1973, however, the Komeito proposed
for the first time a complete abrogation of the treaty. In the
Komeito view, Japan would then enter into a period of complete
neutrality. The Komeito also calls for the removal of American
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bases with Self Defense forces being converted into a National
Guard, eventually to be combined with a United Nations Police
Force.
The Democratic Socialist Party (DSP) , which has become
the smallest of the opposition parties, advocates the revision
of the Security Treaty to do away with the stationing of
American forces in Japan. The DSP, however, has rejected
unarmed neutrality and outright abrogation of the treaty.
It contends that the United States would supplement Japan's
Self Defense Forces with the deterrent power of the Seventh
Fleet and with nuclear weapons stationed outside Japan.
In the opposition parties there is general agreement,
with the exception of the DSP, that the Mutual Security Treaty
should be abrogated. All opposition parties therefore have
a pervasive general hostility toward the United States, a
hostility which finds an object of attack in this Mutual
Security Treaty. Since, under the present provisions of the
Security Treaty, either party can cancel it with advance
notification of one year, the result of any opposition party
or of a coalition of parties gaining power could mean the
cancellation of the Security Treaty and perhaps a change in
the status of the Self Defense Force.
Even within the ruling Liberal Democratic Party there is
open debate over the proper position of Japan under the Security
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Agreement. The basic position of the ruling LDP is that the
Self Defense Forces should be strengthened and maintained to
provide for the defense of Japan proper. The Security Treaty
in the LDP view provides strategic security and is the foun-
dation for the defense of Japan. Many government officials
have tended to see the commitment of the United States as an
important part of the ability of Japan to minimize expenditures
on defense. For example, in 1970 the Director General of the
Japanese Defense Agency reported that if the SDF took over from
the United States all military responsibilities in Japan apart
from the question of nuclear weapons, that the cost would be
22four or five times the present defense budget. Other govern-
ment officials have predicted that Japan will have to develop
an autonomous defense capability with a gradual lessening of
dependence on the Security Treaty. However the planning for
security policy has been far from dynamic or all-inclusive.
The structure of the Japanese political system has meant that
taking a strong position on strengthening defense could mean
political suicide.
Until 1973 the LDP, despite internal factions and divi-
sions, has presented a relatively strong and cohesive front,
22John K. Emmerson, Arms, Yen and Power: The Japanese Dilemma .
(New York, 1971) p. 136.
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especially during elections. However in a new development,
the rise of a highly nationalistic, ultra-conservative and
virulently anticommunist faction, the Seirankai, threatens
to disrupt the traditional cohesiveness of the Liberal Demo-
cratic Party. This new organization is made up basically of
young and talented men who have been attractive and successful
candidates in recent elections. The development of this highly
nationalistic faction throws a further unsettling element into
the future of Japanese domestic politics and questions the
ability of the LDP to continue to rule the country with pro-
gressive and dynamic policies.
C. The Base Problem . While many sectors in the United
States have maintained that Japan receives an American financed
free ride in the security area, the Japanese feel that they
pay a fair price in the form of base rights. The American
bases in Japan have been a major source of domestic political
friction. They serve as a conspicious, concrete example of
the Security Treaty and as an object of attack for opposition
parties. In the past they have been the focal point for serious
violent political demonstrations. In addition to acting as a
psychological irritant, they take up valuable real estate in a
nation that is rapidly running out of living space. This base
problem is a complicated one for both the United States and
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Japan. In a sense these bases, despite being politically-
sensitive, have come to symbolize the American commitment to
Japanese security.
Yokosuka, Japan sits on a corner of Tokyo Bay south of
the Tokyo/Yokohama industrial complex. It has been a major
naval base for decades, first for the Imperial Japanese Navy
and then for the United States Seventh Fleet and the Japanese
Maritime Self Defense Force. In 1970 the United States with
the agreement of the Japanese government made arrangements
to withdraw all naval forces in Yokosuka to Sasebo, a smaller
naval base in southern Japan on the island of Kyushu. This
shift would have removed the United States from a relatively
conspicious location in the heavily industrialized and urban-
ized Tokyo/Yokohama complex to a more remote city. After the
arrangements were made, in an about face, the Japanese govern-
ment indirectly requested that the United States retain its
forces in Yokosuka. The United States then reversed all
withdrawal arrangements and returned those units that had been
moved to Yokosuka. It appears that this reversal was motivated,
in part, by the Japanese government's desire to maintain
American military presense in a conspicious position.
Next, in a virtually unreported move in 1972, the United
States shifted the attack carrier Midway and a destroyer
squadron, along with associated air units and dependents, to
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Yokosuka for what was termed a forward deployment. It was
actually a foreign homeporting of United States warships.
The significance of this move as an American commitment to
Japan has escaped American and Japanese observers and, strangely
enough, the press. For even in the halcyon days of United
States/Japanese relations in the early 1960's, no aircraft
carriers were permitted to be homeported in Asia or for that
matter in any other foreign port.
In the face of a Nixon Doctrine, which was interpreted
as a withdrawal from Asian commitment, and the United States-
China detente which was seen as a threat to Japan's security,
the United States sent to Japan a formidable striking force
including one of the Seventh Fleet's powerful carriers. At
the same time, Japan requested the United States to remain in
a military base that in previous years had been a point of
domestic friction and the object of opposition party criticism.
These two actions seem to contradict two common assumptions.
First, despite the rhetoric of the Nixon Doctrine and the
assertion that this doctrine has resulted in a withdrawl of
commitment to Japan's security, the opposite seems to be the
case. Second, while United States bases in Japan are a real
source of friction, Japan when faced with an opportunity to
remove part of this friction, chose not to do so. This decision,
in part, reflected Japan's desire to retain the United States
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security commitment in a conspicious position, in spite of the
very real political costs associated with this commitment.
D. Security Organization
.
SDF. The ability of Japan to defend itself and the
status of its security forces will be a vital determinant to
future foreign policy decisions. In the same way that the
Korean War gave impetus to the Japanese economy, it also pro-
vided the creative spark for the organization that was to grow
into the Self Defense Force. The initial step was the estab-
lishment of a 75,000 man National Police Reserve Force and a
Maritime Safety Agency. When Japan regained its independence
in 1952, a National Safety Agency was established to oversee
the former Police Reserve and Maritime Guard Force. This,
in turn, was superceded by the Defense Agency, comprising the
old security groups under the title of Ground, Air, and Mari-
time Self Defense Forces. As the names of the security
organizations have undergone change, so have the purposes of
these forces evolved from simple internal security to national
defense. This Self Defense Force has grown into a military
if
organization with a powerful conventional capability.
While Japan has consistently spent under one percent of




its GNP for defense, it still supports a growing military
organization. In terms of total military expenditures, Japan
ranked thirteenth in the world in 1970. While military
expenditures in terms of GNP has remained almost constant over
the past several years, the growth in GNP from $14 billion in
1951 to $317 billion in 1971 has meant that the absolute sum
spent on defense has increased over 20 times since 1950.
The limit on defense spending of one percent of the GNP
has become virtually institutionalized in Japan and there are
strong political pressures in government and society which
tend to maintain this spending level. Not the least of these
pressures is a general antipathy, which grew out of World War
II, toward the military. The opposition of the JSP and JCP
is another important factor in restraining military budgets.
Japan conducts defense planning in terms of five year
defense programs and presently is in the midst of the Fourth
Defense Plan scheduled for 1972-1976. The program, as are
all defense plans, has been and continues to be the subject
of intense debate in the Diet. Security policy historically
has been one area of explicit division between the political
parties and matters of defense policy often serve to focus
political debate.





















Source: World Military Expenditures 1971 . United States
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, pp. 31-32.
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The Fourth Defense Plan has proposed the expenditure of
$16.5 billion through the period 1972-1976 and this level of
expenditure was expected to remain below the one percent limit
that has been the unwritten ceiling for several years. Since
this Fourth Defense Plan has emphasized technical improvements
rather than a large increase in manpower, the budget is heavily
oriented toward the purchase and development of military hard-
ware and technical improvement of the armed forces.
The Defense-Business Relationship .
Throughout their history the Japanese have admired good
craftsmanship and have been able to master almost any
technology available to them. In addition, they not
only were able to copy another nation's technology but
usually were able to change and perfect it in such a
way that it became either typically Japanese or at
least better for their purposes than the original
model. 23
The business-government relationship in Japan is truly unique.
In a country which has had as its primary goal national growth,
industry plays a major role. Obviously the relationship between
industry, the government and defense policy is important to any
study of how national technology and defense policy are related.
The Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Trade and Industry
(MITI) are the principle ministries in the Business-Government-




and passes on all budget allocations and is generally considered
to be the most powerful of the various bureaus. This influ-
ential bureau has expressed a preference (largely on fiscal
grounds) for the importation of foreign weapons over domestic
production. In addition, the Ministry of Trade and Industry
has the responsibility of national industrial development and
as such is deeply involved in the development and encouragement
of new technology.
With the rising industrial development of postwar Japan,
business became respectable. This was a revolutionary change
from traditional prewar Japan in which business was not con-
sidered a "suitable" profession. Now the brightest and best
university graduates aim for a career in the business community.
Combined with this new respectability, there is a high degree
of mobility between the leaders of the business community and
positions in the government. This mobility has institutional-
ized informal liason between government officials and business
leaders.
While there is nothing in Japan approaching the scale
of the so-called United States military industrial complex,
business leaders do attempt to influence the government in




defense policy. One of the major ways in which this is done
is by the Federation of Economic Organizations (Keidanren)
.
This prestigious organization represents all major Japanese
firms. Keidanren has a Defense Production Committee which
performs as a combined lobby and as a source of technical
expertise on arms production. It has been quite influential.
For example, after the decision had been made in 1969 to
produce domestically their own Phantom jets, the Defense
Production Committee was called in by government to help
consider technical production questions—what new factories
would be needed and what level of production could be ex-
pected. Another lobby, called the Japanese Weapons Industry
Organization, has been in existence for several years. This
group of arms manufacturing industrialists have advocated a
larger share of the budget of the Ministry of Science and
26
Technology be allocated to defense needs.
A third influential business organization is the Japan
Federation of Employers (Kikkeiren) which operates on a more
public level. This organization, with others, presents the
familiar argument that the economy as a whole will benefit







Under certain economic conditions, the defense industry
could become one of the most important domestic pressures for
increased defense spending. One of the main objects of over-
all defense strategy as outlined by the Defense White Paper
1970 has been to gain independence in production of Japan's
own defense requirements. This goal has not yet been realized
for Japan has not yet acquired the technological capability
to produce independently from its own research and development
the sophisticated fighter planes, missiles, and other auto-
matically controlled weapons the Japanese want. For these it
27
must rely on lxcensmg arrangements with the United States.
Despite this desire for independence, for reasons of economy
Japan has made the decision in some specific areas that the
development of separate military technology, at the present
time, is not worth the expense or effort. However, Japan,
where feasible, has not abandoned the effort to become self-
reliant in weapons production. Even if it is a more expensive
process than foreign purchase, the desire for an independent
capability remains strong. For example, when the Ministry of
Finance recommended that development of the FS-T-2 supersonic
close support fighters by Mitsubishi Aircraft be abandoned for





28Prime Minister Tanaka rejected the proposal.
While the defense portion of total Japanese industrial
production is quite low, there are domestic economic conditions
and pressures which could encourage an increase in the portion
of production devoted to defense. One of these pressures is
the role of the defense industry and its unique position in
the Japanese economy. The defense industry is not intrinsically
important but, rather, important because the firms that are
involved in defense production are also giants of Japan's
civilian economic sector.
The major heavy machinery and heavy electronics equip-
ment manufacturers rank high in the production of defense
material. The contracts to the five biggest manufacturers
for 1969 totaled 57 percent of the total defense production.
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and Mitsubishi Electric alone
accounted for 36 percent of all defense contracts. In fact,
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries easily is Japan's leading defense
producer, receiving over thirty percent of all domestic
contracts and, with the exception of the Badge Dection System,
Misubishi has manufactured all major weapons items not imported
**
from the United States.







POSITION OF DEFENSE PRODUCTION IN INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION
(100 million yen)
Year Defense Industrial a/b
1958 1,016 92,464 1.1
1959 1,003 132,312 0.8
1960 1,158 169,068 0.7
1961 1,035 202,992 0.5
1962 1,201 203,498 0.6
1963 1,287 227,140 0.6
1964 1,610 266,379 0.6
1965 1,417 281,827 0.5
1966 1,476 326,388 0.5
1967 1,723 396,623 0.4
1968 1,708 462,845 0.4
"Reality of Defense Industry in Its 20th Year" TOYO KEIZAI
September 19, 1970. Summaries of Selected Magazines , U.S.




POSITION OF DEFENSE INDUSTRIES 1969
(100 million yen)
Sum of Rate to
money of total of
Industry contracts (a) contracts sales (b) a/b
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries 701.3 30.9 7,072.5 9.9
Kawasaki Heavy Industries 214.1 9.5 2,159.5 9.9
Ishikawajima-Harima 191.7 8.5 3,365.9 5.4
Mitsubishi Electric Machine 113.6 5.0 3,761.3 3.0
NEC 59.0 2.6 1,957.0 3.0
Toshiba 47.5 2.1 5,502.0 0.9
Hitachi, Ltd. 38.2 1.7 6,750.8 0.6
Komatsu Mfg. 36.4 1.6 2,076.4 0.8
Japan Aircraft Mfg. 28.2 1.2
C. Itoh & Co. 23.8 1.1 2,564.3 0.1
Shimazu Mfg. 23.5 1.0 326.1 7.2
Daikin Industry 23.3 1.0 403.6 5.8
Fuji Heavy Industries 23.1 1.0 975.9 2.4
Maizuru Heavy Industries 22.6 1.0
Sumitomo Heavy Machinery 21.8 1.0 904.8 12.4
Mitsui Shipbuilding 17.9 0.8 1,179.1 1.5
Tokyo Precision Instrument 17.9 0.8 144.7 2.4
Isuzu Motors 17.9 0.8 1,948.8 0.9
Oki Electric Industry 16.5 0.7 575.2 2.9
Fujitsu Ltd. 16.2 0.7 1,194.2 1.4
"Reality of Defense Industry in Its 20th Year," TOYO KEIZAI
September 19, 1970. Summaries of Selected Magazines , U.S.
Embassy, Tokyo, November, 1970, pp. 18, 19.
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The defense industries, with justification, have been
called oligopolistic, Table 5 illustrates how four giant
companies dominate the defense industry. While these huge
companies obviously deal largely in production of other than
defense material, defense sales continue to be a significant
part of their total revenue. A basic question then is what
forces or economic conditions would lead these industries to
lobby for expanded production in the defense sector? There
are several conditions which might encourage expansion in this
area.
The severe labor shortage facing Japan is a major
problem for all Japanese industry. In 1970-1971, the Japanese
Labor Ministry predicted the current skilled labor shortage
29
at 1,820,000. The problem has not improved since then.
This acute labor shortage has two related areas of impact on
the defense industry. First, because the shortage has caused
an accelerating upward spiral of wage demand, labor intensive
industries in Japan find it increasingly difficult to compete
with labor intensive industries of other Asian nations. One
strategy for combating this labor shortage is to establish
the labor intensive industry in the countries with inexpensive




and Thailand. A second general result of this labor shortage
has been to encourage the growth in Japan of capital and
knowledge intensive industries. The defense companies are,
for the most part, capital and knowledge intensive. In this
regard arms production is viewed as an area in which Japan
can compete effectively on both an international and domestic
basis.
In a reversal of past high growth and capital export
policy, the government recently has shown signs of moving to
restrict the outflow of capital and encouraging this capital
to be invested domestically. This is a logical economic
tactic to combat a declining growth rate. A reasonable area
for this capital to be invested would be in the capital or
knowledge intensive industries of the industrial-defense
sector.
Another important point in consideration of the possible
influence of the defense industry is that demand in the non-
defense sector is less elastic. For example, in a period of
economic downturn in which the government might want to stim-
ulate the economy by increasing domestic demand, it is easier
to create this demand with expanded defense spending than to
create demand in the civilian sector where demand is relatively
inelastic. In other words, government can develop an arti-
ficial demand and spur the domestic economy through expanded
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defense contracts more easily than this can be done in the
civilian sector.
In addition to being an area in which an elastic demand
can be created artifically, the arms industry offers the added
incentive of being another source of export revenue. The
Japanese are building an arms export industry which has applied
pressure on the government to relax restrictions on exports of
arms. This pressure could become significant, especially if
the trade balance continues to decline and the government
begins to search for new industries to act as sources of
export revenue. However, to this point, the general national
pacifist bias and strict government regulation has strictly
limited arms exports. MITI regulates arms exports in accor-
dance with three basic principles: no sales to communist
countries; to countries embargoed by the UN; or belligerents.
While arms industry wants to expand arms exports, its desire
has been tempered by both public opinion and strict government
regulation. "Fear of antagonizing public opinion at home and
abroad, " remarks Frank Langdon, has kept them (the arms industry)
from clamoring too loudly and Japan's trade balance has been
too favorable for their economic arguments to gain much
attention. "^O The disappearance of a favorable balance of
trade may raise the volume of the voice of the arms industry
30Frank Langdon in Morley, p. 134.
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and its influence with the government.
The bleak outlook for future economic growth and the
opposition of the JCP and JSP in the Diet has meant that the
Fourth Defense Plan has undergone hard sledding. The presi-
dent of Mitsubishi Heavy Industries for example has complained
that about 10 percent of the workers at this company's air-
craft division will be left idle even if the Fourth Defense
31Plan is fully implemented. It is a general disappointment
to the arms industries as a whole that some of the original
programs scheduled in the Fourth Defense Plan have been
cancelled. These cancellations and delays have had the
additional effect of inflating weapons systems prices.
Another problem faced by the defense industries in
Japan, one that inflates contract prices and pushes expansion,
is the requirement for increased spending for weapons research
and development. The Japanese Defense Agency's program for
*
research and development is very limited. Japan alloted only
1.4% of the 1972 defense budget to research and development
compared to 9% in the United States, 17.1% in France, and 5.9%
in West Germany. As a result, the defense firms themselves
bear the burden of a large amount of R & D outlays. These
•3 1
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expenses are then passed on to the government in the procure-
ment contracts. When cutbacks occur, as they have in the
Fourth Defense Plan, costs have to be absorbed by the industries.
These industries argue that under the circumstances, it is
incumbent upon the Defense Agency to increase procurements and
take other countermeasures under the Fifth Defense Plan if
procurements of the weapons are not sufficiently large under
the Fourth Defense Plan.^2 Thus cutbacks in one program have
the tendency to inflate the next five year defense plan.
Another pressure for increased defense spending comes
from those industries whose existence depends exclusively on
defense contracts. Perhaps the best example is the aircraft
industry. Table 7 illustrates the important role that the
Defense Agency plays in creating demand in the aircraft indus-
try. In 1972, for example, the Defense Agency accounted for
81 percent of the total aircraft demand. Again Mitsubishi
Heavy Industries, Fuji Heavy Industries and Ishikawa-Harima
Heavy Industries dominate the aircraft production. The major
aircraft firms, because of their heavy dependence on defense,
continue to press for increased expenditures in this area. In
1972 Mitsubishi, Fuji and Kawasaki all complained of from 10 to
20 percent declines in the utilization of their facilities. The




SUPPLY AND DEMAND OF AIRCRAFT
(100 million yen)
Total
Year Production SDF U.S. F
1967 789 467 57
1968 922 481 49
1969 986 530 57
1970 1,103 709 50
1971 1.097 777 38













Source: Japan Economic Yearbook 1972
, p. 162. 1972 figures
from The Oriental Economist , June 1973, p. 39.

51
aircraft industry, knowledge intensive and technologically
oriented with little hope of expanded production in the
commercial area, will continue to be one of the loud voices
demanding increased defense expenditures.
The impact on government of pressure from the defense
industry to expand weapons production will depend largely on
the state of the general economy. As long as a high growth
rate continues and the giant industrial groups are producing
at or near capacity, there should be less pressure to expand
defense contracts. However, if there is a general economic
downturn in which the industrial giants are faced with large
excess capacities, the demands of these industries for govern-
ment defense contracts will become much stronger. In this type
of senario, the government might tend to look at defense pro-
duction as a logical area in which to promote domestic demand.
It has been demonstrated that it is probable that the Japanese
economy for a wide variety of reasons such as increases in
costs and more limited access to raw materials, a severe labor
shortage, and domestic political pressures, faces a declining
growth rate. This declining growth rate, in turn, will
strenghten the Japanese Self Force and those sectors of Japanese




The Nuclear Dilemma . While Article IX of the
Constitution denied the right of belligerency, and there has
been, until recently, adament opposition to even the discussion
of nuclear weapons in Japan, the 1970 Defense Agency White
Paper provides an interesting insight to the present situation:
Even though it would be possible to say that in
legal and theoretical sense possession of small nuclear
weapons falling within the minimum requirement for
capacity necessary for self-defense and not posing a
threat of agression to other countries, would be per-
missible, the government, as its policy, adopts the
principle of not attempting at nuclear armament which
might be possible under the Constitution. 3
What the Defense Agency is doing in this case is to leave the
nuclear option open. The significance of the above paragraph
is that 15 or even 10 years ago the subject could not have been
raised by the Defense Agency without severe criticism from all
sides. The impact of the understandable "nuclear allergy"
resulting from Japan's experience in WW II has been on the
wane. Political and psychological barriers to nuclear arma-
ment are declining in Japanese society and politics.
As further evidence of the changing views on nuclear
weapons, while Japan has signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation
Treaty, it has not been, and the prospects are that it will
33
The Defense of Japan (Tokyo, 1970> p. 40.
34Shelton L. Williams, Nuclear Nonproliferation in International
Politics : The Japanese Case , (Denver, 1972) p. 23.
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not be, ratified. Discussion concerning nuclear weapons is
now in the open. In addition, the government has presented
the view that nuclear and conventional weapons are theore-
tically the same thing in so far as they are used for defense
35protection. A natural conclusion from the above evidence
is that the Japanese government is keeping its options open
concerning the decision to develop nuclear weapons. The
next question concerns the status of nuclear science and
technology in Japan today and the possibility of moving
civilian commercial nuclear technology into weapons construc-
tion?
In contrast to other countries, Japan's progress in
nuclear development has been in the hands of civilian agencies
and private industry. Control over nuclear development is
embodied in legislation: Japan's Atomic Energy Act, article
II, confines research, development, and application in the
field of nuclear energy to peaceful use of the atom.
Japan's nuclear power industry has been expanding rapidly.
There are presently six nuclear generating plants with one
more to be added by 1975 giving the country a generating
capacity of 6000 megawatts by 1985; a program that would make




for Japan's industry is that it is now completely dependent
on the United States for enriched uranium, the fuel used in
its power generating plants. An Atomic Energy Agreement
signed in 1968 guarantees this supply for thirty years.
Nevertheless, Japan has been attempting to develop her own
fuel sources.
There are two basic methods of obtaining enriched
uranium. The gaseous diffusion method is presently the only
commercially exploitable process although it is expensive
and difficult. The second process is the gas centrifuge
which, once perfected, will lower the electricity costs of
enriching uranium. Japan has been conducting research in
both of these processes. A third method of obtaining fissible
materials is the fast breeder reactor which converts slightly
enriched uranium to PU 239 and will actually produce more
Plutonium than it consumes. The Japanese Power Reactor and
Nuclear Fuel Development Agency has been set up to develop fast
breeder reactors by the 1985-1994 period.
One interesting factor in the development of the Japanese
nuclear power industry is that it was done without the initial
heavy government involvement where that involvement has been





computers. Capital for power plant construction has come from
the United States Export-Import Bank and from a limited amount
of Japanese industrial investment. One of the problems until
recently has been capital and the splintering of funds between
the two types of fuel enrichment processes has hindered the
37
overall development progress.
However, despite the fact of limited and hesitant
enthusiasm for investment, Japan's accomplishments in the
peaceful uses of nuclear power are significant and many
authorities have demonstrated how progress in the civilian
area could have military application. The availability of
fissible materials is the most critical element in the devel-
opment of nuclear weapons. In a 1968 report, the Security
Research Council, an auxilliary organization of the Defense
Agency, stated that 20-30 weapons a year could be produced
if the Tokai reactors of Japan's Atomic Power Generation
Company could be devoted only to production of Plutonium
239. On the same subject, in 1969, Japan's Science and
Technology Agency said Japan had enough fissionable material
on hand to produce ten atomic bombs and the stockpile would
reach fifty tons by 1985—enough to build 150 atomic bombs. 9
37Morley, p. 127.
38Williams, p. 3.
39Albert Axelbank, Black Star Over Japan, (New York, 1972) p. 223.
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Before taking these statements at face value, however, a
caution is in order. The most simple nuclear weapon is a
gun type. This weapon requires enriched uranium 235 while
the more complicated implosion weapon can be made with
Plutonium 239. The problem for weapons makers is that most
Plutonium produced in civilian facilities is contaminated
with Plutonium 240, an element which would make a weapon highly
inefficient and unstable. The quality of the Japanese supply
of Plutonium is unknown but it may not be accurate to assume
that it all would be suitable, without further and extensive
processing, for weapons fabrication.
Assuming that the Japanese could put forth the effort
to produce the required material, the next step is construc-
tion of a delivery system. Victor Gilinsky, discussing the
cost of a nuclear weapons program, has stated:
There is no succinct answer because there is no
unique cost of a nuclear warhead, any more than there
is of an airplane. However, . . . it is probably
reasonably accurate to say $1 million per warhead—or
more than several hundred thousand dollars and probably
less than several million—with a minimum total program
cost for a stockpile of perhaps tens of millions of
dollars or more. In any event, the warhead cost will
probably be less than the cost of a nuclear weapons
'
delivery system. 40
^victor Gilinsky, "Military Potential of Civilian Nuclear
Power, " in Nuclear Proliferation ; ' Prospects For Control ,
edited by Benett Bosky and Mason Wilbrick, (Cambridge
Mass, 1970) p. 52.
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In any discussion of Japanese missile technology and
delivery systems, it is worthwhile to note that many of the
aircraft in the Japanese Air Self Defense Force could carry
or be modified to carry nuclear weapons.
Like the Japanese nuclear program, Japan's space program
began as essentially a civilian project, without significant
government supervision. This program has progressed from the
firing of the unsophisticated "pencil" in 1955 to the success-
ful launching of a satellite in February of 1970. Japan has
developed a dual set of goals for this space program. Emphasis
is placed on both developing domestic technology and in intro-
ducing foreign technology to reduce areas in which there are
technological gaps. The Science and Technology Agency and
the National Space Development Agency direct the planned space
program. These agencies have a sophisticated programmed
schedule of satellite launching beginning in 1975 and finish-
ing in 1977.
One of the greatest changes in Japanese goals has been
in the development of a domestic booster stage with a pro-
grammed lift-off thrust of 700,000 lbs. However, the agencies
decided that national attempts to develop the booster would
take excessive time and delay scheduled launches. McDonnell
Douglass Thor Delta then was picked as a replacement and
several were purchased. "Although the quantity is small, such

58
a step will permit the Japanese industry to improve its
technical competence in this area.
Japan's demonstrated competence and accomplishments in
space technology are indeed significant but there are problems
In its application to a weapons program. There are major steps
necessary to transfer this civilian development to military
application. One area in which there are basic deficiencies
is in Japan's development of the guidance system necessary
to build a missile delivery system. The United States, while
it will sell Thor Delta rockets to Japan, has shown extreme
reluctance to part with design data for such sensitive items
42
as accelerometers and precision gyroscopes. At the same
time, "The telling indication of Japan's move toward military
use of their space missile systems would be the initiation
43
of a program to develop re-entry techniques.
One of the elements in both the nuclear and the missile
fields which will tend to limit the military application of
these civilian projects is the attitude of the people involved.
This is an important element because the academic and scientific
community is strongly anti-military and generally anti-government.





The reasons for this attitude are many and varied and the
opinions of authorities vary as to the impact this attitude
would have on the decision to develop nuclear weapons.
"The rarity of academic proponents of an independent
deterrent, " writes John Welfield, "is not really surprising
in a nation where, for the past twenty years, pacifism,
opposition to nuclear weapons, fear of a militarist revival
and some kind of vague belief in Socialism have been . . .
the very hallmark of academic orthodoxy." Welfield goes on to
contend that he believes that with the pacifist mood of the
Japanese scientific world, it would be impossible to obtain
the cooperation of the four or five hundred scientists
necessary for the implementation of a nuclear weapons ' pro-
gram. Taking the opposite point of view, George Quester
argues that the nuclear allergy is eroding and that Japanese
scientists will definitely become more and more equipped to
45produce weapons when requested. In defending his position
Questor contends that the increased employment opportunities
in the applied nuclear physics of the electrical power industry
will weaken the traditional academic control of junior psysicists
44John Welfield, Japan and Nuclear China , (Canberra, 1970)
p. 29.
45George Questar, "Japan and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty, " Asian Survey , September 1970, p. 776.
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pro-bomb impulses. While the Japanese scientific community
is hostile to government and the control of the present
nuclear programs are in the hands of civilians who are
particularly sensitive to the military implications of their
endeavors, Japanese scientists are not a central force in
the making of policy decisions. The conservative government
and burearcracy has maintained close control of the policy
making process.
The question for the future is whether the Japanese
take the nuclear option. The required technology is avail-
able. For example, Zbigniew B. Brzezinski recently has stated
that the Japanese have succeeded at their attempts at the
centrigugal separation method for the enrichment of Uranium
46235. This development would give the Japanese a production
capability in small plants at a relatively low cost. This
capability, in turn, would make the Japanese independent of
the United States for material for reactors and weapons.
The next problem for the Japanese would be the assembly
and testing of weapons. Neither of these problems is insolv-
able. If the decision is made to build weapons, a place
undoubtedly will be found to test them.




construction of a delivery system. On this question
knowledgeable observers have stated that Japan could build a
nuclear weapon within 2 years of making the decision and
shift from the civilian space program to build an inter-
mediate Range Ballistic Missile within three years of the
47
commencement of the project.
The technological ability to construct weapons and
delivery systems is demons tratably within the capability
of Japan. While the decision to take this path has not been
made, the failure to sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
and the attempt to develop domestic uranium enrichment
facilities indicate that the Japanese have left the decision
open. The nuclear allergy and general opposition of the
scientific community argue against any such development. On
the other hand, there are indications that the Japanese are
aware this step may be necessary in the future. On this point,
the Japanese Defense Agency has stated that in order to defend
Japan without the help of the United States it must have a
national draft and nuclear weapons. In the same view, "I have
predicted," states Herman Kahn, ". . .that within the next
five or ten years the Japanese are likely to unequivocably
48





If the Japanese do make the decision to develop weapons,
it would cause turmoil both in society in general and in the
scientific community in particular. The decision would be one
in which the Japanese make a concerted decision to use tech-
nology in a much more sensitive way than in promoting the
Japanese economy.
E. Public Opinion on Security Matters . A 1973 opinion
poll by Tokyo Shimbun examined attitudes of the Japanese public
concerning the Security Treaty, the Self Defense Force and
49Article IX of the Constitution. On the question of the
decision by a Sapporo District Court that ruled the SDF
unconstitutional, 25.9 percent of those polled supported the
decision, 25.1 percent did not support it, and 49 percent
either did not have an opinion or did not know. In another
question concerning the proper scale of the SDF, only 9.2
percent thought it should be strengthened, 49.3 percent thought
the present scale satisfactory and only 9.5 percent of the
people thought it should be reduced.
On the question of the revision of Article IX of the
Constitution, only 20 percent of those surveyed believed that
the article should be revised, while 41.4 percent opposed
4 ^Daily Summary of the Japanese Press , December 1-3; American
Embassy, Tokyo, Tokyo Shimbun , November 24, 1973, pp. 18-24.
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revision but wanted to retain the SDF. Fifteen percent
believed there was no need for a Self Defense Force. On a
question concerning the retention of the Security Treaty and
the SDF, 4.5 percent felt that the SDF should be strengthened
and the Security Treaty abolished, 43.1 percent felt that
emphasis should be placed on the Security Treaty complemented
by the SDF. Finally 12.9 percent called for abolishment of
the Security Treaty and a reduced SDF. The results of this
limited poll seem to indicate that the majority of the Japanese
people favor the status quo as regards the Security Treaty,
Self Defense Force and Article IX of the Constitution. The
gradual growth of the SDF seems to confirm this status quo bias




V. JAPAN IN EAST ASIA
While Japan is not a global superpower in the same sense
that this status is recognized in the United States and the
Soviet Union, it does wield great economic leverage. This
is especially true in East Asia where Japan is recognized as
50
a regional superpower. In East Asia, Japan faces three
primary potential security threats. These threats come from
the two major powers who have influence and the desire to
extend this influence in Asia, China and Russia, and with the
remaining less developed countries of the region to whom Japan
looms as a somewhat threatening giant despite its lack of
military strength. The regional politics of East Asia can
be understood best in terms of the interaction of the nations
who act as regional superpowers—Japan, China, Russia, and the
United States—and the bloc of less developed nations who,
while not militarily powerful, are strategically and politically
important.
As a result of the success of Japan's trading company
style of foreign policy, it has become deeply involved in the
economic fabric of East Asia. This relationship has been
East Asia in this sense includes the following countries:
China, Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Burma, Thailand, Cambodia, Laos,
Viet Nam, Malaysia, Singapore, Philippines, and Indonesia.
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characterized as analagous to the dominant economic role of
the United States in Latin America. The analogy is accurate.
Japan, with the exception of South Viet Nam, is the leading
trading partner of every country in East Asia. This huge
economic role, despite Japan's attempt to treat economic,
political and security matters as separate and distinct areas,
logically leads to a deeper Japanese political involvement
with these countries. The strategic and geographical impor-
tance of the countries astride critical ocean straits has been
documented. These same countries serve as sources of raw
material, as export markets, and as location for Japanese
owned industries which take advantage of the large and rela-
tively inexpensive labor forces.
Southeast Asia today seems more than ever an area of
built-in instability, an instability with a propensity toward
conflict. In none of these countries, except perhaps Singapore,
is there a solid, positive base for stability. William Bundy
has echoed the feelings of many observers such as Herman Kahn
when in 1971 he predicted that Southeast Asia would continue
52
to be a source of violence for the next 20 years. The Nixon
51Kahn, p. 138.
52William P. Bundy, "New Tides in SEA", Foreign Affairs ,
January 1971, p. 190.
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Doctrine and the emergence of nuclear China has added further
elements of insecurity for the already burdened leaders of
Southeast Asian countries. Dennis Bloodworth, an English
journalist with broad experience in Southeast Asia, believes
for example there is an almost pathologic instability in this
area:
Nations do not run amok, but the new countries of
Southeast Asia jealous of their often slender
repute and conscious of condensention in others
will sometimes fling themselves into a seemingly
senseless fury which bewilders the calculating
West and introduces an X-factor into Far Eastern
affairs which confounds all computers. J
This cronic instability or "X-factor" could have a
serious destabilizing effect on Japanese policy and national
security. With increasing economic interdependency, Japan
will not be able to avoid, no matter how much it might hope,
deeper political involvement in the morass of Southeast Asian
affairs. With this involvement will come further foreign policy
complications for Japan's economic and political security.
The disasterous Southeast Asian tour of Premier Kakuei
Tanaka in January 1974 illustrated a growing problem for Japan.
In a geographical area in which Japan is conducting rapid
economic expansion, there is a vocal and growing outcry against
5




Japanese business policies and what is felt to be Japanese
economic exploitation and imperialism. The riots in Bangkok
and Jakarta, which had definite racial anti-Japanese over-
tones, indicated the Japanese public relations efforts in
54these countries has been somewhat less than successful.
These riots echoed cries of "Yankee Go Home" heard in the
Latin America of 15 years ago. In a contradictory way,
however, the anti-Japanese riots in Southeast Asia are another
factor which encourages Japan to become even more deeply in-
volved in this unstable area. As an outgrowth of Asian
unhappiness with Japanese business policy, the pressure to
increase foreign aid to Southeast Asia has increased. In
response Japan has agreed to increase foreign aid. This
involvement comes in a region in which Japan has proven itself
least able to cope—a region definitely not status quo but
rather changing rapidly, dramatically and most important
unpredictably
.
A. China Center Stage . From 1949 through 1970, China retreated
from formal diplomatic relationships with most of the Western
world. Japan, following as always the lead of the United
54Thailand's Minister of Foreign Affairs has commented, "The
Japanese stay to themselves: they fly in on Japan Air Lines,
are met by Japanese guides, ride to Bangkok in Japanese busses,
where they stay in Japanese hotels, eat and drink in Japanese
restaurants, all staffed by Japanese. . . ."
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States, held China at arms length while building a lucrative
economic relationship with Taiwan. Although there was plenty
of warning, the 1971/1972 Sino-American rapproachment marked
a dramatic reversal in China's policy and found Japan's policy
makers unprepared. President Nixon's visit to China became one
of the "shocks " that caused Japan to begin to take a new look
at its security relationship with the United States. In this
reappraisal the United States was strongly critized in Japan
for not consulting with its major ally in the Pacific on a
matter of great importance to the future security of Asia.
The Chinese-United States meetings pushed the Japanese
into establishing diplomatic relations with China. China,
in turn, extracted a heavy price for the new relationship.
First, by indicating that they would not deal with the Sato
government, the PRC influenced the change to the Tanaka
55
Administration. Second, Japan was forced to cut formal
diplomatic relationships with Taiwan. This move caused a
serious split between Taipei and Tokyo.
With the explosion of a nuclear weapon in 1964, China
became much more of a threat to Japan's security than it had
55
For a discussion of Japan s relations with the Peoples
Republic and Chinese influence on 'Japanese domestic politics
see Donald C. Hellmann, Japan and East Asia , pp. 53-54,
75-78, 172-176. And Gene T. Haiao, "The Sino-Japanese
Rapproachment: A Relationship of Ambivalence," The China
Quarterly, January/March 1974, pp. 101-123.
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ever been before. Prior to this time, the Chinese military
forces—huge armies and a relatively weak navy and air force
—designed primarily for the defense of the homeland, offered
little threat to Japanese security. Then the genesis of an
infant yet growing Chinese nuclear capability encouraged the
Japanese to place renewed emphasis on the United States security
treaty. It also undermined Japan's traditional psychological
superiority over China, and while China's ability to deliver
nuclear weapons is somewhat limited, it has developed and
deployed medium and intermediate range ballistic missiles
and is building Russian designed TU-16 Bombers. At present
most of these missiles are deployed along the northern fron-
56
tier aimed at the Soviet Union.
There is a basic dichotomy in the manner in which China
views Japan. First a second historical basis exists for China's
suspicion and fear of renewed militarism in Japan. In addition,
China continues to believe that there is something economically
57
inevitable about Japan's being a menace. On the other hand,
there are real short term economic and political gains to be
made by close relationships with Japan. China needs foreign
capital and the advanced technology which Japan can deliver.
56The Strategic Balance , 1972.
57Chalmers Johnson, "How China and Japan Views Each Other,
"
Foreign Affairs, July 1972, p. 716.
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In 1972, for instance, Japan's total trade with China reached
$920 million and it is estimated that by 1977, it will reach
$2.1 billion and that by 1982 it could grow to $11.3 billion. 58
China, as an added inducement to trade, has promised Japan a
part of its limited but growing petroleum production.
There also has been a change in the Chinese view of the
American-Japanese arrangement. In discussions between Chou
En Lai and Premier Tanaka it was made clear that China had no
objections to the Fourth Defense Plan or to the United States
59
Security Treaty. This admission on the part of China is a
reversal of policy on the part of a nation that since 1952
has been very critical of the Security Treaty which it viewed
as an integral part of the American containment policy. Chinese
acceptance of the Japanese military program has been interpreted
as a realization on the part of China that its best insurance
against a nuclear armed Japan is this security arrangement
between the United States and Japan. In addition and perhaps
even more important, the United States-Japanese security
relationship provides a balance to the ever growing strength
of the Soviet Union in the Pacific. A good example of the value
58Far Eastern Economic Review , November 25, 1972, p. 33.
59Donald C. Hellmann, "Japan and the Great Powers in Post-
Vietnam Asia, " Pacific Community , July 1973, p. 596.
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China places on the new relationship with America is that,
after the Nixon visit, a sizeable military force was moved
away from the Fukien Straits, opposite Taiwan, to the North-
east to bolster defense against the Soviet Union. Even now
China maintains from 55 to 60 infantry divisions in military
regions adjacent to the Soviet Union.
While China's primary security concern, now that the
United States has lost the number one position, as China's
enemy, is the Soviet Union, some observers feel that China's
secondary concern is more long term in character and is
directed at forestalling Japan's reemergence as a great
military power which could logically inherit the American
position on the rimland of continental Asia. But in the
short run, China realistically has nothing to fear from Japan
in a military sense.
In 1947, Harold Isaccs, sounding like the patron saint
of the modern revisionists wrote:
The haggard ghosts of 400 million customers in
China still sit in at all the councils where American
Far Eastern Policy is made. They are still an unrealized
dream. All the years of competition and rivalry, of
wars and treaties and bloodshed and suffering have been
60For this point of view on possible Japanese military
developments and Chinese security 'objectives, see
John Welfield, "A New Balance: Japan Versus China?",




for the United States, based not on existing realities
but on elusive expectations. *>1
This paragraph easily could have been written about Japan's
perspective of China. Japan's view of China is contradictory
and the vast market potential of this nation has attracted
Japanese businessmen for decades. But while trade is increas-
ing, this vast potential, as Isaccs predicted, may prove as
elusive to the Japanese as it did to Western nations in the
late
. 19th and early 20th centuries. Another important element
of Japan's relationship with China is that Japan's history is
one of a sort of psychological dependence on Chinese culture.
In this regard, many segments of Japanese society feel a sense
of "national guilt" for Japan's World War II actions in China.
In the same manner, China has always been "popular" with
Japanese society.
Prior to Premier Tanaka's visit, the China question
played a major role in the factional battles within the Liberal
Democratic Party. Even now after recognition of the People's
Republic of China, the question of China versus Taiwan assumes
a major role in intra- and inter-party political conflict. The
dispute over a Japan/China aviation treaty has served as a focus
of the most recent dispute. Japan Air Lines operated a highly
profitable freight and passenger service with Taiwan for many
61Harold Isaccs, No Peace for Asia (New York, 1948) p. 258.
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years. The signing of an air agreement with the Peoples
Republic added further tension to Japan's relations with
Taiwan. The debate over this question has been especially
violent between the conservatives and liberal wings of the
LDP where a new ultra-conservative faction, the Seirankai,
62
recently surfaced. " When Japan and China signed an air pact,
Taiwan refused permission for all Japanese aircraft to land
in Taiwan or to fly through Taiwanese airspace. Regardless
of the final outcome, the dispute will leave a lasting emnity
within the ranks of the LDP.
Despite the fact that Japan and China have important
motivations for economic and political cooperation, there are
other factors, perhaps more serious, that will tend to inhibit
the smooth course of Japanese-Chinese relations. One area of
contention between Japan and China is a dispute over the con-
trol of the Senkaku Islands. These small uninhabited islands
are located approximately 200 miles northeast of Taiwan. Large
seabed petroleum deposits are believed to exist under these
otherwise insignificant specks in the East China Sea. The
islands are claimed by China, Taiwan, and Korea while Japan
62
For details concerning the emergence of the Seirankai, see
J. Rey Maeno, "Japan 1973: The End of an Era" Asian Survey .
January 1974, pp. 52-57. And "Blue Storm Society," Seattle
Post Intelligencer , Tuesday, February 19, 1974, p. 13.
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maintains the islands are a part of the Ryuku chain. The
dispute is likely to remain a source of friction between Japan
and China, one that becomes more important as Japan's energy
problems become more severe. China's claim for these seabed
rights is simple and sweeping. It asserts that the continental
shelf is a natural extension of the continent and that sover-
eignty therefore extends to the edge of the shelf. ^3 The
conflict between South Vietnam and China in the Paracel Islands
in the South China Sea illustrates the fact that China is
willing to fight to protect those areas over which it feels it
has historical, economic, or political claims. This is another
factor which will complicate Japan's increasing political
involvement in East Asia.
More important than a dispute over ownership of the
Senkakus however, is the fact that China and Japan have con-
flicting fundamental objectives and interests in East Asia.
These interests and objectives are so basically different that
they must inevitably lead to conflict and tension. This has
been presented concisely by Donald C. Hellmann who argues
that within the East Asian subsystem, "China presents the
^ 3China's position on continental seas oil exploration is
reviewed in Nicholas Ludlow, "U.S*. Companies and China's
Oil Development," The New York Times , Sunday March 3,
1974, Section 3, p. 2.
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greatest security threat to Japan in that both nations are
engaged in Asia on several levels and place special priority
...
. . 64
on relations with nations in this area."
Japan is a nation whose security and prosperity depend
on stable, secure economic markets, especially in Southeast
Asia. China, in contrast, has a vested interest in ensuring
that neither Japan nor any other nation establishes economic
or political hegemony in countries on its periphery. China,
then, has no vested interest in the status quo. In fact, in
the long run, as long as non communist nations remain on its
border, a turbulent Southeast Asia is to China's advantage.
The unstable political environment in China and the fragile
nature of its elderly leadership is yet another element
leading to the unpredictability of its future policy. In the
struggle for influence and markets in East Asia, China will
come into direct confrontation with a Japan having a vital
interest in expanding both political and economic power in the
same region. The impact of this rivalry will tend to increase
Japanese concern with security problems and, if Japan determines
that the stability of Southeast Asia can not be maintained with
a foreign policy of "economic neutralism, " it will have to
consider other alternatives of ensuring this stability. One of
64Donald C. Hellmann, Japan and East Asia , p. 174.
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the obvious options is to develop the capability of enforc-
ing or at least influencing the stability of the region in
a military sense. To do this effectively, nuclear weapons
must be considered.
B. Japan and Russia . Traditionally the relationship
between the Soviet Union and Japan has not been cordial and
there continue.* to be serious areas of disagreement between
the countries: The unresolved peace treaty, fishing rights,
and the Northern Territories issue all are complicated areas
of contention. In addition, while there is little chance of
an invasion of the home islands, the Soviet Union presents
a basic security threat, especially in its growing Pacific
naval power. From cruisers in the Indian Ocean to nuclear
submarines in the Sea of Japan, the Soviet Union is increasing
its strength, a strength which, in time of crisis, could
threaten Japan's vulnerable economic life lines.
The Northern Territories taken by Russia after the end
of World War II, the islands of Etorofu, Kumashiri, Shikotan,
and Habomai, remain a stumbling block to any progress in
signing of a peace treaty between Japan and the Soviet Union.
Under the Sato government, it was understood that any type of
formal political or economic agreement would have to be tied
to a return of these Northern Territories. The Tanaka
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government, however, has evidently softened its position and
65is willing to separate this issue from other negotiations.
One of Japan's primary motivations in reaching some
sort of agreement with the Soviet Union is economic. There
are large oil reserves in the Tyumen area of Siberia and
large oil reserves in Yakutsk; both of these areas are
attractive sources of energy for Japan. Under negotiations
presently in progress Japan would provide the Soviet Union
with $1.5 billion in credits and sell Russia the steel pipe
for a line that would run 4,300 kilometers from Irkutsk to
the Pacific Ocean. In return Japan would get 25 to 40
million tons of low-sulfur crude oil per year for 20 years.
American commercial interests also are interested in these
emerging sources and are negotiating for a share in part
of this development. The Soviet Union in turn has shown
great interest in this proposed American participation.
Japan has viewed American participation in the Tyumen
and Yakutsk projects with mixed emotions. First, any share
by the United States in the proceeding would necessarily
reduce Japan's share of the project. On the other hand,
Elizabeth Pond, "The View From Tokyo, " Foreign Affairs ,
October 1973, p. 142.
66Ibid. p. 147.
67Naji Kakamura, "Ice on the Wind," Far Eastern Economic
Review, October 28, 1972, p. 13.
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the Japanese have seen the role of the United States as a
stabilizing element in the arrangement and as an assurance
to the Chinese that this is not a bilateral collusion
between the Soviet Union and Japan. In addition, United
States participation is seen by the Japanese as a guarantee
that the Soviet Union would fulfill its commitment to delivery
of oil and natural gas to Japan. The Chinese, and to some
extent the United States, are concerned over the strategic
aspects of the proposed extension of the oil pipeline. This
pipeline would supply fuel both to Soviet forces along the
Chinese Societ border and to Vladivostock, the major Pacific
Russian naval base. The Russian navy presently must bring
in petroleum by vulnerable tanker and the pipeline extension
would expand significantly Soviet naval flexibility in the
Pacific. Japan's growing interest and involvement in the
construction of the project is another factor which will lead
to tension in Sino-Japanese relations.
Whatever happens in Russian-Japanese economic negotia-
tions, the Soviets are moving slowly. They certainly will
attempt to extract the maximum political and economic benefit
from any arrangement with the Japanese and there is evidence
that the Soviet Union is using this economic pressure to attempt
to push Japan into the Russian concept of a collective security
system in Asia. This "security system" concept certainly is
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a part of Russia's attempt to contain China and can be
interpreted as the Soviet effort toward a solution to the new
68geometry of East Asia.
There are three basic objectives in Russia's proposed
system of collective security. First and primary is the
containment and neutralization of the PRC. The second is
to prepare for further expansion in Asia. The third is to
69
forestall the development of new Asian alliances. What
Moscow seems to be proposing is not a traditional system of
collective security in the accepted sense, but rather a system
of collective defense under Soviet control directed against
China, a sort of Russian style of "Containment. " The present
positioning of Soviet military forces on the Chinese border
is a manifestation of this primary concern. As of late 1972,
the Soviet Union has almost 45 infantry and armoured divisions
supported by a wide variety of nuclear weapons and airpower
alligned along the Chinese border. In regard to the Chinese
military threat, Russian and Japanese interests are similar.
In a much different manner than Japan, the Soviet Union has a
68For a discussion of the Soviet Union's proposal for
collective security see Alexander Ghebelhardt, Asian Survey ,
December 1973, pp. 1084-1091.
Thomas W. Robinson, "Soviet Pi
Problems of Communism, November-December 1973, p. 43,




vested interest in Asian stability as long as this stability
does not threaten Soviet interests. While Russia undoubtedly
would like to see political changes in East Asia, it also
might be willing to settle for the status quo in the short
and medimum term.
In Premier Tanaka's visit to Moscow the Russians pushed
Japan on this issue of collective security in Asia but, on the
other hand, were unwilling to make any concession on the
territorial or peace treaty issues, evidently believing that
economic pressure of Tyumen and Yakutsk would gradually bring
Japan to the Soviet view. The Japanese however have been
extremely reluctant to consider the Soviet proposal and have
stated that they will not enter into any agreement that can
be construed as "containment" of China.
Japan, in its relationship with both China and the
Soviet Union, has found it necessary to walk a dangerous and
narrow path attempting to keep from giving either nation the
impression that it favors one side over the interests of the
other. In many respects Japan is the rope in a tug of war
between China and Russia. Both nations would like to use
Japan to balance the power of the other and both countries
have a basic interest in seeing that Japan does not develop
a nuclear weapons capability or come under the political
dominance of the other. Both China and the USSR may view
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the United States-Japan Security Treaty, in the short run,
as a factor in restraining Japan from adopting nuclear weapons.
This Soviet/Chinese perspective should remain as long as
the United States retains a balance in its relations with the
Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China.
C. Japanese Security Options . While there are many
subtle variations of security policy available to Japan,
stripped to basic essentials there are four possibly viable
security options. First, is the option of developing an
independent military capability. Eventually this option would
require at least the consideration of the development of
nuclear weapons to counter Chinese and Russian threats. Second,
Japan could become a neutral nation with a minimum military
force, depending on multilateral organizations and agreements
to guarantee security. A third choice would be a new bilateral
arrangement with either China or the Soviet Union. Finally,
Japan could continue the present security arrangement with the
United States, attempting to negotiate modifications to reflect
their view of the political situation in Asia.
Even though Japan is now and has been since the late
1960's undergoing a reexamination of its basic security policy,
the Security Treaty appears to be the most rational of the
options available, especially under the leadership of the LDP.
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This arrangement assures security and allows Japan considerable
freedom of action while giving up relatively little in return.
There is little that the Japanese now provide under the Security
Agreement that could not be renegotiated with the United States
if the domestic political costs become unacceptable. American
military bases in Japan, for example, could be reduced sub-
stantially or eliminated without the United States feeling
that the security relationship was threatened. In fact, the
elimination of bases in Japan could enhance United States
political and military flexibility in Asia.
Japan's ability to negotiate bilaterally with both the
Chinese and Russians is the most obvious example of the
flexibility provided by the present Security Agreement. The
development of an independent nuclear force by Japan would
mean that the diplomatic footing would become more trecherous
and policy options perhaps less flexible. Both China and
the Soviet Union would be extremely apprehensive faced with a
nuclear Japan. A neutral, non-military stance also offers
many dangers and would make an already vulnerable Japan more
susceptable to threats from unhappy or antagonistic superpowers
and from suppliers of vital raw materials.
The nature of Japanese foreign policy formulation,
favoring as it does the status quo also argues for a contin-
uation of the Security Agreement with the United States.
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Despite the wide publicity given opposition to the Security
Treaty in the Japanese press, public opinion seems to favor a
continuation of some form of security relationship with the
United States. In conclusion, it appears that Japan's most
probable course of action is a continuation of the relation-
ship with the United States attempting to make minor modifi-
cations in that agreement as the necessity arises. This
course of action is most probable under the leadership of
the LDP. A shift to opposition leadership probably would
mean a drastic change in at least the external and public




VI. THE UNITED STATES IN EAST ASIA: THE RHETORIC
AND THE REALITY.
A. The Nixon Doctrine
. To this point this paper has
been concerned basically with East Asian security systems
analyzed from the point of view of Japan. The interests of
the United States have been noted only in so far as they affect
Japan. However, with the perspective already developed, it is
possible to examine this security system from the point of view
of the interests of the United States in Asia.
The United States presently operates under a vaguely
defined policy—the Nixon Doctrine. First set forth in Guam
by President Nixon in 1969, this policy stated that American
forces should not be maintained for the purpose of dealing
with local wars of national liberation or subversion. Rather,
support would be given to the national forces of friendly
governments. Allies would be supported and all commitments
met, but nations would be expected to do their own fighting.
Despite these guidelines, the doctrine itself has never been
defined in concrete terms. In fact, its undefined nature is
one of its principle characteristics. One scholar has written,
"In the White House the doctrine is seen as a calculated
strategy of foreign policy integrally related to specific
concepts of national interest, national power, and the
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70international environment. " This doctrine has been outlined
further by Melvin Laird who maintains it contains "both high
principle and practical realism." "We seek," Laird writes,
"not the words but allies, nations which are able and enthus-
iastic practicioners of their own self-defense, so that what
aid we do give them would be supplementary, not primary.
"
71
This doctrine then is designed to make logical, pragmatic
decisions based on the criteria of each decision being in the
direct interest of the United States. Just what these American
interests are is not defined.
Another interpretation contends that the Nixon Doctrine
is a type of indeterminacy, as moving in a direction toward
72
greater appreciation of international complexity. This may
be true but it is also true that the importance of this doctrine
in terms of its impact on Japan and other Asian nations raises
serious questions concerning the effect of this ambiguous
foreign policy. "Indeterminacy" makes it difficult for allies
such as Japan to interpret the meaning of America's defense
commitments. It is clear that the Nixon Doctrine is not a
70Osgood, p. 32.
71Melvin R. Laird, The Nixon Doctrine (Washington, 1972)
p. 24.
72Robert J. Pranger, Defense Implications of International
Indeterminancy, (Washington, 1972) p. 30.
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fixed, concrete policy amenable to concise definition as,
for example, was the Containment Doctrine. It is flexible,
even variable, and evidently still in the process of evolution.
While it is designed to give much greater latitude to policy
decision, its designed flexibility calls into question tradi-
tional American security commitments. This is especially true
in Asia where the shadow of the Vietnamese storm still thunders
and flashes on the horizon of American foreign policy and adds
further questions concerning America's security commitment
there.
It is a generally accepted view that the ending of the
Viet Nam war and the Nixon Doctrine are symbols of at least
a partial disengagement of the United States from Asian in-
volvement and Asian responsibilities. Questions have been
raised, especially in Japan, on the continuing validity of the
American political and security promises. Political scientists
and Asian scholars have interpreted this doctrine in the same
manner as an American retreat from Asia. This is a logical
interpretation of the rehetoric of the Nixon Doctrine. But
what of the reality? To determine the real meaning of the
Nixon Doctrine, American actions in Asia since the end of the
Vietnamese war must be examined closely. United States actions
in East Asia since the end of the war do not necessarily
indicate disengagement from security responsibilities. The
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present strategic allignment may indicate not only an increased
appreciation of the Asian political realities but an increased
willingness to support the new strategic situation.
B. The Crescent Strategy . Before 1965, the military
strength and focus of attention of the United States in the
Pacific was concentrated in Northeast Asia and was designed
to protect Japan and Korea from the Sino-Soviet threat.
While the military concentrations were located in Japan and
Korea, there were also large American bases in the Philippines
but very little in the way of military forces, other than
advisory groups, in the rest of Southeast Asia. The United
States Navy seldom wandered into the Indian Ocean. For the
circumstances of that Viet Nam period this was a logical
positioning of forces and seemed a reasonable strategy in
response to what was felt to be the primary communist threat.
In the 1960 's, a variety of factors, the Viet Nam war,
the Sino-Soviet split and others, moved the geographical focus
of American forces to Southeast Asia. Thailand became a major
base area for the American Air Force, and, for the first time,
the United States Navy began to take serious interest in the
Indian Ocean.
The debate over the validity 6f the American commitment
to Viet Nam will last for decades. But in many respects, it
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was a strategic anomaly, a costly one. It was a war that
violated the traditional strategic pattern of the United States'
interests in East Asia. It violated the principle that had
long served as gospel to the American military—that the United
States could not win nor should it become involved in a land
war in Asia. The war seemed to prove that the United States
did not have the power to act as an international policeman.
This war was an anomaly then because it violated America's
traditional strategic objective and unbalanced our military
and political perspective of Asia.
What has been the impact of Viet Nam on the strategic
position and capabilities of the United States forces in
Asia? Many respected and knowledgeable analysts have stated
that the war has resulted in a significant reduction in the
capability of the United States to react not only in a political
but in a military sense in Asia and that there is now a "security
vacuum. " In supporting their argument they point to the reduc-
tion in United States forces stationed in Asia since the ending
of the American participation in the war. Secondly, many
political scientists and journalists argue that the resolve and
will of the American nation was weakened by this Southeast Asian
war. The "mood" in America is seen as a new sense of isolation-
ism. For example, "the Nixon Doctrine, " writes Donald C.
Hellmann, "is not fully developed policy position but rather a
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response or a set of responses to new international politics
away from the international principles on which the nation's
73diplomacy has rested since 1945."
It is impossible to refute the second of these arguments
for the proof of American resolve in the Pacific will have to
rest on a future test of that resolve. The first of these
arguments, however, that the United States had reduced its
military commitment to Asia and created a vacuum, is not
entirely reflected in the evidence. Since the Viet Nam war,
there has been a dramatic realignment of United States forces
in the Pacific. Military forces are positioned now in a more
balanced deployment than was the case before or during America's
involvement in Viet Nam. It is true that a number of combat
units have been removed, not only from Southeast Asia, but
74
also from Korea. The reasons for the pullback from Viet Nam
are obvious. The reduction of forces in Korea, however, came
first in response to Viet Nam, then as an appreciation of the
change in the strategic balance in the Pacific, the power
balance between North and South Korea, and in the domestic
73Hellmann, Japan and East Asia , p. 126.
7 Defense Secretary Schlesinger indicated in March of 1974
that gradual phaseout of army troops in Korea was under
consideration. These troops would be replaced by a mobile




political pressures in the United States. The Sino-Soviet
split, eventual rapproachment between the United States and
China and the detente with the Soviet Union are additional
factors influencing this realignment.
United States forces are now deployed in a chain of
bases that form a rough crescent stretching from Japan and
Korea in the Northern Pacific to an island speck in the middle
of the Indian Ocean. Subic Bay and Clark Air Force Base in
the Philippines, navy and air force bases in Guam, a communi-
cations station in Australia, and the air force bases in
Thailand make up the links of the chain. The arc is anchored
in Northeast Asia in Korea and Japan and in the Indian Ocean
in the new naval base on the island of Diego Garcia. It is
this new general deployment that gives credibility to the
argument that the United States is, in a sense, realigning
its role in the Pacific rather than retreating.
One of the most significant American expansions is in
the Indian Ocean. Its importance as a pathway of petroleum
from the Persian Gulf to East Asia has already been illus-
trated. Until near the end of the war in Viet Nam, the United
States either showed little interest or did not consider it
worth the effort to maintain forces in the Indian Ocean. Since
then, however, the United States Navy has taken a leading role
and the Seventh Fleet now maintains a Task Force on station in
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the Indian Ocean, led by either an aircraft carrier or
by a missile cruiser. In addition, on Diego Garcia, an
island located in the middle of the Indian Ocean and
leased from the British, the United States recently
constructed a communications station and, much to the
chagrin of the Indian government, is planning further
expansion. While the Indian Ocean expansion is in response
to many factors, the growing influence of the Soviet Union
in this area and the importance of the ocean as an
access to the Persian Gulf are priority considerations.
The proposed opening of the Suez Canal will make the
Indian Ocean even more strategically significant.
Another region in which it appears that America
is expanding its military influence is in the Trust
Territory of the Pacific Islands—Micronesia. America
already has an extensive military network on Guam and it
is evident that expansion is being comtemplated into other
islands of the chain, the names of which, Tinian and
Saipan, are quite familiar to veterans of World War II.
While there has been little published in the United States
on this subject, the Japanese press has shown great interest
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75and a greater alarm over expansion in this area. The
strategic value of bases constructed in Micronesia would be
in their ability to be used as fall back positions should
the United States be forced out or decide to leave bases in
Korea, Japan, Thailand or the Philippines. Although there are
political problems with military basing in Micronesia, the
United States would have more viable political control and a
greater strategic flexibility than in areas such as Japan
and the Philippines.
The realignment of military forces admitedly is in a
sense a retreat. But on the other hand, it also may indicate
first a better appreciation of political factors in Asia and
second, the desire for a more flexible ability to respond to
future Asian security commitments.
C. Prospects . This paper began with the premise that
the post Viet Nam era is one in which both the United States
and Japan are undergoing fundamental evaluations of their
75For information concerning United States military activity
in Micronesia see: "Micronesia Where the Construction of
United States Military Bases is Progressing, " Asahi Journal
September 29, 1972, in Summaries of Selected Magazines ,
U.S. Embassy, Tokyo, pp. 27-34, And Donald F. Smith,
"Diversity in Micronesia," Current History , November 1973,
pp. 221-225, And Robert Trumbull, "Micronesians Divided on
Self Rule," New York Times , November 4, 1973, Sec. 1, p. 14.
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respective security positions in Asia. Since 1950, American
policy in Asia has anchored itself in a security relationship
with Japan. As long as the internal political costs do not
become prohibitive for either country, there is no reason why
this relationship should not continue. In a recent article
a Japanese political commentator wrote, "from the standpoint
of Japan, there certainly is reason to believe that the
possibility of the treaty becoming a major obstacle to
continued overall friendly Japan-U.S. relations has greatly
7fidecreased.
The Japan-U.S. Security Treaty of 1960 grants Japan
a right of mutual "prior consultation" on U.S. bases in actions
involving deployment of U.S. forces into or out of Japan.
While this right of prior consultation has not been utilized,
during the Viet Nam war opposition protests limited the
movement of U.S. forces and material in Japan. Recently the
opposition of the Japanese government may have been instrumental
in restricting the movement of Seventh Fleet ships based in
Japan into the Indian Ocean. Restrictions on the movement
of American forces by Japan could prove unacceptable in future
incidents in which Japanese and United States interests con-
flict. In order to improve flexibility of the use of military
76
Kei Wakaizumi, "Summit Diplomacy, " Pacific Community ,
January 1974, pp. 271-288.
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forces based in Japan it might be necessary to remove these
forces to less sensitive areas.
The United States' bases in Japan are political irritants
and it may be necessary for the United States, in the interest
of long-term political gain, to consider voluntary removal of
all or some of these bases. This voluntary withdrawl could
come in response to domestic political pressure on the Japanese
government or even in advance of anticipated pressure of this
nature. In this regard, some American observers have proposed
that the United States prepare to surrender some of the less
strategically important bases in Japan. One important point
is that there is significantly less opposition to the naval
bases of the U.S. Seventh Fleet in Japan than there is to the
logistic support facilities, headquarters bases, staging and
training areas of the United States Army, Air Force, and
77Marine Corp." These latter bases are not viewed by the
Japanese as providing basic security to the home islands,
while the Seventh Fleet bases are seen as valuable in helping
to continued open sea lanes. In Japan itself there are no
American combat troops and, with the exception of headquarters
and logistic bases, only the Seventh Fleet and some Air Force
James E. Auer, "Toward a Pacific Maritime Union,
"
Pacific Community , October 1973, p. 39.
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bases contain combat units. The Navy bases are more remote
from urban areas, take up less valuable living space and
generally provide less of a political problem than bases
closer to urban areas.
The Marine division in Okinawa is a somewhat greater
problem. It is a strong military force and provides a flexible
combat response capability in Asia. However, there are other
locations in which it could be based and where it would be
less of a political problem; Guam, Hawaii or even in the
Trust Territories for example. Other American bases in
Thailand and possibly in the Philippines certainly can be
expected to come under the same type of political pressure
experienced in Japan. The United States strategic planning
must be flexible enough to provide alternative basing for
these forces while, at the same time, minimizing the political
friction involved in the base withdrawal. The ability to
anticipate political pressure and to move in advance of it
might even lead to political advantage.
One of the primary rationale for maintaining bases
in Japan has been to defend Korea. The willingness of the
Secretary of Defense to consider removal of United States
forces from Korea is an indication that the requirement of
defending Korea is becoming less important and the bases in
Japan far less critical.
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The increasing strength of the Japanese SDF could serve
to play a significant role in the future security of East
Asia. That is, if the Japanese are in some manner forced to
change their traditional posture of using these forces solely
for the defense of the home islands. However even if Japanese
forces are not used outside of Japan, their increasing strength
relieves the United States of the burden of providing conven-
tional defense forces for security of the Japanese archipelago.
The increasing involvement of Japan in Asia and the effect of
this increasing interaction in entangling Japan in Asian
politics will encourage Japan to develop a more agressive
security policy. The increasing competition between Japan
and China and the fundamental differences of interest between
these two giants are factors which also tend to encourage the
development of a stronger Japanese security force in addition
to a more sophisticated foreign policy.
A thorny problem for the United States is what course
of action to take should Japan decide to develop nuclear
weapons. Since Japan is and will for sometime be dependent
on foreign sources of uranium, principally from the United
States, it would be in the interests of America to continue
this dependent relationship. Little would be gained by
severing the security relationship while, on the other hand,
there would be a great deal to be gained by retaining some
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degree of control or influence over whatever nuclear capability
the Japanese might develop.
It is probable that while a nuclear Japan would appear
threatening to China, Russia and the developing countries
of Asia, a nuclear Japan, restrained by the United States,
would be more acceptable. Instead of agressively pushing
the Japanese to assume a greater security role in Asia while
at the same time attempting to restrict the development of
nuclear weapons, the United States should let Japan's role
in Asian political affairs take its natural course. The
increasing involvement of Japan in the complicated political
and economic issues of this area will result in a natural
evolution in a gradually increased scope of Japanese security
commitment. In the meantime, the bases being used by the
United States in Japan should be returned gradually to Japan.
This course of action would both turn valuable real estate
over to the Japanese and greatly reduce a serious area of
political irritation. The removal of bases from Japan would
remove the limitation of prior consultation and increase the
flexibility of these forces.
The security relationship between the United States and
Japan is one that has provided benefits to both countries.
This relationship is in the process of evolving into a system
in which Japan plays the role of a more equal partner. The
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redaction in the physical presence of the United States in
Japan is only one of the many complicated issues of the security
agreement but it is one that could lead to greater cooperation
and understanding in broader political and economic relations.
The security relationship between the United States and
Japan must evolve in response to new power relationships in
Asia. But whatever form this security relationship takes in
attempting to solve the new geometry of Asia, a vital element
will continue to be the United States guarantee of a strategic
security umbrella for Japan. In order for this security agree-
ment to be viable, Japan, regardless of the level of American
forces actually based there, must be able to depend on the
American commitment. With the guarantee of American support,
Japan can provide a stabilizing force in an area of the world




Comparative Gross National Products
($Billion)*
Year USA Japan West Ger. France Britain
1952 350 16 32 29 44
1953 370 19 35 31 48
1954 365 20 37 32 50
1955 399 23 43 35 54
1956 420 25 47 39 58
1957 444 28 51 43 62
1958 455 32 56 50 65
1959 484 33 60 54 67
1960 511 39 71 60 72
1961 520 51 81 65 77
1962 560 59 89 74 81
1963 590 68 94 83 86
1964 632 80 103 93 93
1965 685 88 115 99 100
1966 748 102 123 108 107
1967 794 120 124 116 110
1968 865 142 135 127 103
1969 931 166 151 142 110
1970 976 198 189 149 121
1971 1050 221 217 164 135
1972 1152 317 259 202 151





STRENGTH AND STATUS OF THE JAPANESE ARMED FORCES
Population: 107,000,000.
Military service: voluntary.
Total armed forces: 266,000.
Estimated GNP 1972: $316.8 Billion.
Defense budget 1973-74: 935.5 billion yen. ($3,530 million)
Army : 180,000.
1 mechanized division.
12 infantry divisions (7,000-9,000 men each)
1 airborne brigade.
1 artillery brigade.












5 motor torpedo boats.
4 tank landing ships.
1 medium landing ship.
6 landing craft.
42 small landing craft.
Naval Air: 110 Combat aircraft. 7MR sqns. with P2V-7, P2-J,
S2F-1 and PS-1. 60 Helicopters.
Air Force : 44,600: 386 combat aircraft.
4 FGA sqns. with 120 F-86F (F4EJ being introduced)
.
10 interceptor sqns. with 150 F-104J, 20 F-4EJ and 80 F-86F.
1 recce sqn. with 16 RF-86F (being replaced by RF-4EJ in 1973,
14 are on order.)
2 transport sqns. with 20 C-46 and 10 YS-11.
360 T-l, T-33, T-34 and F-104 DJ trainers.
5 SAM bns. with Nike-J.
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Year Yen $ Million GNP Ratio of Defense to:
(Billion) General account
1952 183 508 N.A. N.A.
1953 126 350 1.67 13.01
1954 135 375 1.78 13.96
1955 135 375 1.52 13.61
1956 143 397 1.44 13.81
1957 144 400 1.28 12.61
1958 149 414 1.26 11.31
1959 156 433 1.15 10.99
1960 160 444 0.99 9.99
1961 184 511 0.91 9.23
1962 214 594 0.96 8.59
1963 248 689 0.94 8.46
1964 281 781 0.93 8.45
1965 305 847 0.92 8.23
1966 345 958 0.89 7.90
1967 387 1 ,075 0.84 7.69
1968 422 1 ,172 0.79 7.25
1969 495 1 ,375 0.77 7.18
1970 590 1 ,639 0.78 7.16
1971 694 1 ,928 0.83 7.13
1972 821 2 ,718
1. Dollars value presented at the rates ruling each year.
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